

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

26 May 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: John Bird
Chief Naval Operations Branch, OSR

FROM : Rear Admiral J. J. Ekelund, USN
National Intelligence Officer for
Conventional Forces

SUBJECT : Navy Comments on OSR SLOC Paper

1. Navy has finally come through and their full comments are attached. There are several points which I think are good ones for your consideration.

a. The target system and selectivity of targets. There is a vast difference which should be recognized.



ONI
(b)(1)

c. The firearm model merely does the logistics mathematics. Other appropriate details are excluded from this simple calculation--i.e., losses to escorts, failure to acquire targets--which would tend to make SLOC less attractive.

d. Use of selected writings--vice representative writings.

e. If effectiveness is the decision criterion, then why would the Soviets actually speed assets on anti-SSBN--which they know they can't do--in lieu of interdiction.

- 5100s low
major major
- 5100s low
more threat

f. Why exclude amphibious and replenishment ships from this mission? The Soviets would likely not hold a reserve force for this mission but use forces in the interdiction area and reinforce the eastern end of the lanes when intelligence told them of amphibious convoys.


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
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
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g. Rigidity of mission priorities. What is the effect if the Soviet change priorities in accordance with capabilities. Perhaps the 33 percent level then is more pertinent.

h. I question the Soviet effort to force dispersal of convoy/- *use* ASW assets. We would accept random South Atlantic and east coast *effect on* sinkings--as we did in WWII--with only token force reallocation, *qualifying* if any. *attitudes*

i. I agree that training against escorted military formations is good training against convoys--and even more rigorous. Our current anti-ship attack training is gained exclusively through attacking escorted military formations. The question should focus on how much they train at that vs. other mission oriented training. *How much anti-ship training?*


J. Ekelund

Attachment:

Navy paper